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NOTE
CRIMINAL LAW-THE EMERGENCY EXCEPTION TO MI
RANDA V. ARIZONA: A RETROSPECTIVE AND COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S. Ct. 2626
(1984)
I.

INTRODUCTION

In New York v. Quarles, 1 the United States Supreme Court con
fronted a case in which there was no question that the requirements of
Miranda v. Arizona 2 had been violated. 3 The suspect's self-incriminat
ing statement, obtained in violation of Miranda, could not be used to
prove his guilt. 4 The Court, however, created an exception to the Mi
randa requirements and held that police need not advise a criminal
suspect of his constitutional rights when they "ask questions reason
ably prompted by a concern for the public safety."s The Court deter
mined that "concern for public safety must be paramount to
I. 467 U.S. 649, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984).
2. 384 u.s. 436 (1966).
Miranda required that a suspect in police custody must be warned prior to any ques
tioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him
in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot
afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
[d. at 479.
3. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2631.
The threshold question to determine when a criminal suspect is entitled to the warn
ings required by Miranda is whether he is in police custody or is "otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477.
In Quarles, the suspect had been handcuffed immediately by Officer Kraft and hence
was entitled to receive the Miranda warnings before the police interrogated him. Quarles,
467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2631; See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 326-27 (1969)
(Miranda applies when suspect is under arrest whether or not interrogation takes place in
police station); Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1968) (Miranda applies when
accused is questioned in jail on an unrelated charge); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477. He was
then interrogated about the whereabouts of a weapon that the police believed he had been
carrying. Quarles, 467 U.S. at - , 104 S. Ct. at 2629-30; see Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.
291, 300 (1980).
4. E. g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3145 (1984). But cf. Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)(statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be used to
impeach the accused's trial testimony).
5. Quarles, 467 U.S. at - , 104 S. Ct. at 2632.
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adherence to the literal language of the prophylactic rules enunciated
in Miranda."6 As an exception to the dictates of Miranda, failure to
recite the required warnings will no longer bar the admissiblity of
statements made in response to custodial interrogation7 as long as
that questioning is geared to protecting the public safety.8
Although the majority claims Quarles is a narrow exception to
the requirements of Miranda, the public safety exception has the po
tential to expand significantly. To test the bounds of the public safety
exception, this note will focus on its impact through a retrospective
review of three Supreme Court cases decided before Quarles. The pur
pose of this approach is twofold. First, the note will explore the
breadth of the public safety exception9 through an analysis of the facts
in Orozco v. Texas.lO The character of a threat to public safety which
justifies invocation of the Quarles exception is far from clear. While
the court said that it is only an imminent threat to public safety which
justifies custodial interrogation without fulfilling the requirements of
Miranda, the Court did not provide any guidance to determine the
magnitude of danger necessary to trigger the Quarles exception.
Second, the note will. consider the possible expansion of the public
safety rationale to the Fifth Amendment right to counsell I and the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel 12 through examination of the facts
in Rhode Island v. Innis 13 and Brewer v. Williams. 14 On another
plane, Quarles may only serve as a logical progression in the Court's
increasing focus on public safety. The court has recognized the permis
sibility of warrantless entries and searches in the interest of protecting

6. Id. at - , 104 S. Ct. at 2630. A significant element in the Court's analysis is the
finding that the Miranda requirements are not constitutionally mandated, but rather are
prophylacttic measures to ensure protection of the right against self-incrimination. Id. at
-, 104 S. Ct. at 2631 (citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974». See infra
notes 105-150.
7. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2632. The Court in Miranda said that "the
prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from
custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safe
guards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Miranda, 384 U.S. at
444.
8. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2632.
9. See infra notes 82-104 and accompanying text.
10. 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
11. See infra notes 105-150.
12. See infra notes 151-190.
13. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
14. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
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the public. IS The Court has now read a public safety exception into
Miranda's Fifth Amendment protections. 16 The next logical step in
the progression is to apply the narrow exception of Quarles to the judi
cially created Fifth Amendment right to counsel. But how far should
the court extend the public safety reasoning? While it is harmonious
with Quarles to extend the exception to permit abridgement of the
Fifth Amendment right to counsel, the Court's reasoning is inapt to
justify an extension of Quarles into the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.

II.

FACTS

On September 11, 1980, at approximately 12:30 a.m., a woman
informed two police officers on road patrol in Queens, New York, that
she had been raped at gunpoint.17 The two officers, Frank Kraft and
Sal Scarring, drove the woman one quarter of a block to the supermar
ket which she saw her attacker enter. IS Officer Scarring radioed for
assistance while Officer Kraft entered the supermarket in search of the
suspect. 19 Officer Kraft stood at the front of the deserted store20 and
saw the respondent Quarles, who matched the description of the rap
15. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978)("A burning building clearly
presents an exigency of sufficient proportions to render a warrantless entry 'reasonable.' ").
In finding that Miranda's requirements are not constitutionally mandated, the Court
closely tracks the course it has been following in gradually diluting the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2630, n.3; Gardner, The
Emerging Good Faith Exception to the Miranda Rule A Critique, 35 HASTINGS L. J. 429, .
457 (1984). Compare United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3412 (1984)(ex
clusionary rule is "a judically created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment
rights generally through its deterrent effect rather than a personal constitutional right of
the person aggrieved.")(quoting Calandra v. United States, 414 U.S. 338,348 (1974» with
Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1293 (1985)(failure to provide Miranda should not bar
admissibility of a non-coerced confession where suppression would not serve deterrence
function).
16. But cf Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2630 n.3 (Fifth Amendment require
ments cannot be outweighed upon a showing of reasonableness but judicially created Mi
randa rights are subject to balancing test).
17. [d. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2629.
18. Brief for the petitioner at 4, New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S. Ct. 2626
(1984).
19. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2629.
20. [d. In determining that the weapon which Quarles was alleged to be carrying
was missing in the supermarket, thereby posing a danger to the public safety, the majority
failed to take note that there were no customers in the supermarket at the time. See [d. at
-, 104 S. Ct. at 2632. The dissent, however, focused on this omission to question the
validity of the majority's conclusion that the missing weapon posed a danger to public
safety. [d. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2642-43 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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ist,21 approach the check-out counter. Upon seeing Officer Kraft,
Quarles fled to the rear of the store with Officer Kraft in pursuit. 22
Quarles was promptly surrounded by Officer Kraft and three other
police officers. 23 While the officers pointed their guns at Quarles, Of
ficer Kraft frisked him and discovered an empty shoulder holster. 24
Officer Kraft then handcuffed Quarles, at which time the other officers
put their guns away.25 After handcuffing Quarles, Officer Kraft asked
him, "Where is the gun?'~6 Quarles looked in the direction of some
nearby cartons and said, 'The gun is over there. '~7 After Officer Kraft
pulled a loaded revolver from one of the cartons, he told Quarles that
he was under arrest and then gave him the Miranda warnings.
Quarles then consented to answer further questions regarding the gun,
and he admitted that he was the owner of the weapon. 28
Quarles was subsequently prosecuted for criminal possession of a
weapon 29 under New York law. 30 At a suppression hearing, the trial
court excluded the statement "the gun is over there" on the ground
21. The woman described the rapist as a six foot black man who was wearing a black
jacket with yellow letters which spelled out "Big Ben." Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2629.
22. Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2629-30.
23. Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2630.
24. Id. See also id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2642 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
25. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2642 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2630.
27. Id.
28. Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2630. Quarles admitted that he had purchased the gun in
Miami, Florida. Id. On the admissibility of the subsequent confession after the Miranda
warnings have been given, see Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985)(holding that con
fession obtained after Miranda warnings given not tainted by a prior voluntary confession
which violated Miranda on grounds that failure to comply with Miranda evokes no consti
tutional illegality).
29. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2629. Although Quarles was initially
charged with rape as well, the record does not disclose the reason the state failed to prose
cute further. Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2630 n.2.
30. Quarles was originally charged with possession of a weapon in the second degree.
Joint Appendix at la, Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984). "A person is guilty of
criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree when he possesses a . . . loaded
firearm with intent to use the same unlawfully against another." N.Y. PENAL LAW
§265.03 (McKinney 1980). The grand jury, however, returned an indictment of one count
of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S. Ct.
2626 (1984) Joint Appendix at 3a. "A person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon
in the third degree when [h]e knowingly possesses any loaded firearm. Such possession
shall not . . . constitute a violation of this section if such possession takes place in such
person's home or place of business." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.02 (McKinney 1980).
Since the state failed to prosecute Quarles for rape, he could not be prosecuted with
intending to use the gun against another, thereby necessitating reduction of the charge to
simple unlawful possession. See People v. Forestieri, 87 A.D.2d 523, 448 N.Y.S.2d 12
(1982).
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that it had been made without the benefit of the Miranda warnings. 31
The court also suppressed both the weapon and the subsequent admis
sion of ownership as tainted fruit derived from the prior Miranda
violation. 32
The appellate division of the Supreme Court of New York unani
mously affirmed the suppression order without opinion. 33 The New
York Court of Appeals affirmed in a 4-3 decision. 34 The court of ap
peals held that Quarles's statement and the gun were properly sup
pressed because they were obtained in the absence of preinterrogation
warnings to safeguard the privilege against se1f-incrimination. 35 Addi
tionally, the court held that the admissions obtained after Miranda
warnings had been given were properly excluded as tainted fruit. 36
The court of appeals noted:
Even if it be assumed that an emergency exception to the normal rule
might be recognized if the purpose of the police inquiry had been to locate
and to confiscate the gun for the protection of the public as distinguished
from their desire to obtain evidence of criminal activity on the part of the
defendant. . . there is no evidence in the record. . . that there were exigent
circumstances posing a risk to the public safety or that the police interroga
tion was prompted by any such concern. 37

The dissenters thought, however, that the single question posed
by Officer Kraft was not custodial interrogation within the meaning of
Miranda because it was designed "to achieve an articulable and legiti
mate noninvestigatory purpose. "38 The dissent saw Officer Kraft's ini
31. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2630.
32. [d. at -, 104 s. Ct. at 2630. The Supreme Court has decided, however, relying
on Quarles, that there is no fruit of the poisonous tree for noncoercive Miranda violations.
See Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1293 (1985).
33. People v. Quarles, 85 A.D.2d 936, 447 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1981)(mem.), affd, 58
N.Y.2d 664, 444 N.E.2d 984, 458 N.Y.S.2d 520 (1982), rev'd, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S. Ct. 2626
(1984).
34. People v. Quarles, 58 N.Y.2d 664, 444 N.E.2d 984, 458 N.Y.S2d 520 (1982),
rev'd, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984).
35. [d. at 666, 444 N.E.2d at 985, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
36. [d. Even if the original Miranda violation was not excusable, Quarles' subsequent
admission would still be admissible since the giving of Miranda warnings dissipated the
taint of the original illegality. See Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985).
37. People v. Quarles, 58 N.Y.2d at 666, 444 N.E.2d at 985 458 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
38. [d. at 669, 444 N.E.2d at 987, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 523 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
The dissent read Miranda to be "concerned with discouraging official conduct which, ex
amined objectively, reveals an unmistakably deliberate attempt to elicit some incriminating
response from the detainee. . . ." [d. at 668-69, 444 N.E.2d at 987, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 523
(Wachtler, J., dissenting). See Gardner, supra note 15 at 455-60; cj United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 3405,3418 (I 984)(purpose of exclusionary rule is to deter violation
of Fourth Amendment by police officers).
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tial question as a "prudent measure undertaken to neutralize the very
real threat of possible physical harm which could result from a
weapon being at large."39

III.

DECISION

The United States Supreme Court reversed the New York Court
of Appeals and held that both Quarles's statements and the gun could
be admitted into evidence. 40 The Court held that on "these facts there
is a public safety exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings
be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted into evidence."41
The Court considered two issues in the formulation of this rule.
First, the Court distinguished the warnings required by Miranda from
the requirements of the Fifth Amendment. 42 The Court labelled the
Miranda warnings as "prophylactic measures" to protect an individ
ual's privilege against self-incrimination as compared to a constitu
tional right of the defendant. 43
39. People v. Quarles, 58 N.Y.2d at 671, 444 N.E.2d at 524, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 524,
(Wachtler, J., dissenting)(footnote omitted).
40. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, - , 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2634 (1984).
41. [d. In finding that the circumstances of this case posed an imminent threat to
public safety, Justice Rehnquist writing for the Court is in effect relitigating the factual
determinations of the court below. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2642 (Marshall, J., dissent
ing); see supra text at note 37.
Ordinarily, the Supreme Court will give great weight to findings of fact made by state
courts on constitutional claims. See Rushen v. Spain, 104 S. Ct. 453, 456-57 (1984); Time,
Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 463 (1976). The Court, however, wi1llook into the factual
determinations of the state courts when findings below create a situation in which constitu
tional rights may be infringed. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397-98 (1978);
Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503,515-16 (1963).
The finding of the New York Court of Appeals that the record indicated that there
was not a threat to public safety did not create a situation where a citizen's constitutional
rights were in danger of infringement. In contrast, the Supreme Court's decision in
Quarles, by reaching factual conclusions opposite to those the state court, has itself created
a circumstance where the privilege against self-incrimination, protected by the Constitu
tion, may have been infringed. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at - , 104 S. Ct. at 2642-43 (Mar
shall, J., dissenting); cf Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 314 (I 980)(Stevens, J.,
dissenting)(Court redetermined factual question of whether defendant was interrogated for
Miranda purposes under the Court's newly created standard of interrogation).
Although Justice Rehnquist finds it suitable to reach the decision in Quarles by a re
adjudication of the facts, he took great exception in another Miranda case decided the
following term in which he accused the majority of reaching their decision by "deciding
[an) essentially factual inquiry contrary to the three other courts that have considered the
question." Smith v. Illinois, 105 S. Ct. 490, 495-96 (1984)(per curiam)(Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
42. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2631.
43. [d. (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974». See Oregon v. El
stad, 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985).
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Second, the Court justified the public safety exception by pro
claiming "that the need for answers to questions in a situation posing a
threat to public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule
protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimina
tion."44 It referred to the willingness of the Miranda Court to accept a
lower conviction rate as the cost of giving additional reinforcement to
the Fifth Amendment. 45 The Court in Quarles, however, determined
that an exception to Miranda is necessary where the cost of reinforcing
the Fifth Amendment is an unchecked threat to the public welfare
rather than merely a lower conviction rate. 46 The Court reasoned that
to require Miranda warnings would deter a suspect from answering
questions when an imminent threat to public safety existed. 47
Justice Marshall wrote a passionate dissent castigating the major
ity's treatment of the case and accusing the Court of abusing the facts
in deciding the appeal. 48 Marshall noted that the New York Court of
Appeals had determined that the missing weapon did not pose a dan
ger to public safety, while the Quarles majority, on the same facts, felt
constrained to create a public safety exception. 49
More significantly, Justice Marshall assailed the majority's crea
tion of the public safety exception as an erosion of Miranda's bright
line rule. 50 He expressed concern over whether police officers would
be capable of drawing distinctions between interrogations designed to
protect the public and those designed to gather evidence. 5 I
Finally, he expressed concern with the majority's holding that the
need to protect the public could outweigh the accused's need for pro
tection of the privilege against self-incrimination afforded by Mi
randa. 52 Justice Marshall read Miranda as concerned with protecting
the Fifth Amendment privilege and not as a formula to balance
44. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2633.
45. [d. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2632.
46. /d. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2632-33; but see Fare v. Michael c., 442 U.S. 707, 718
(1979).
47. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2632-33. In fact, interrogation under the
Quarles rule is likely to be coercive given the urgency of obtaining information to extin
guish a pending threat to the public. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2647 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
48. Justice Marshall was joined in dissent by Justices Brennan and Stevens.
49. [d. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2642 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
50. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2643 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See supra
notes 20-27, 37, 40-41 and accompanying text.
5!. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2644 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See infra
text at notes 60-64.
52. Quarles, 104 U.S. at -, S. Ct. at 2644 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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costs.53 He also predicted that the public safety exception would en
courage the police to withhold deliberately the Miranda warnings in
order to obtain information. 54 Ultimately, Marshall feared that
Quarles would give police carte blanche to coerce responses from sus
pects under the guise of protecting the public. 55
In addressing the dissent's criticism that the public safety excep
tion would allow introduction of coerced self-incriminating state
ments,56 the Court stated that on remand Quarles could always
attempt to prove that his answers to Officer Kraft's questions were
coerced57 under traditional standards.58 In addition, the Court
claimed that "absent actual coercion by the officer, there is no consti
tutional imperative requiring the exclusion of the evidence that results
from police inquiry" into matters posing a threat to public safety.59
IV.

ANALYSIS

The assertion that the rationale underlying Miranda is offended
only when an involuntary confession is sought to be introduced is
flawed for two reasons. First, one of Miranda's primary goals was "to
give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies
and courts to follow."60 An important focus for the Miranda Court
was that the facts surrounding custodial police interrogation are un
certain,61 thereby debilitating an adequate assessment of whether a
particular confession was coerced under the totality of the circum
stances. 62 Although he wrote the majority opinion in Quarles, Justice
Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2645.
Id.
Id. at - , 104 S. Ct. at 2647.
56. Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2647-2648.
57. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2631 n.5. The New York Court of Appeals,
however, upon receiving the case on remand denied Quarles the opportunity to present
evidence in court that his response had been coerced stating that "[i]nasmuch as the issue
was raised and defendant had full opportunity to offer evidence, there is no occasion, . . .
to order a new evidentiary hearing; the question should be resolved on the record of the
prior hearing." People v. Quarles, 63 N.Y.2d 923, 925, 473 N.E.2d 30, 31 483 N.Y.S.2d
678, 679, (1984)(mem.)(citation omitted).
58. See lW. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.2 (1984).
59. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2633 n.7; but see Michigan v. Mosely, 423
U.S. 96, 99-100 (1975)(quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443 (1974)); cf. Smith v.
Illinois, 105 S. Ct. 490, 495 n.8 (1984)(per curiam)(Fifth Amendment right to counsel "is a
prophylactic safeguard whose application does not turn on whether coercion in fact was
employed") Id.
60. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441-42; Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96, 113 (1975)(Bren
nan, J., dissenting).
61. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448; See Quarles, 467 U.S. at - , 104 S. Ct. at 2631.
62. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445. The Miranda Court, acknowledging that the chal
53.
54.
55.
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Rehnquist has conceded that a central concept of Miranda was "to
offer a more comprehensive and less subjective protection than the
doctrine of previous cases."63 The public safety exception has elimi
nated the bright-line rule that was once Miranda's greatest attribute. 64
Second, although protection of the public safety is a valued
goal,65 the interest of the state in fighting crime does not excuse a dis
regard for an accused's constitutional rights. 66 "The policies underly
ing the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination are not
diminished simply because testimony is compelled to protect the pub
lic's safety."67 As a practical matter, when faced with a pressing need
to thwart a threat to the public, interrogation designed to obtain this
information is bound to be coercive in order to avoid delay.68 While
the Quarles Court claims to have removed a dilemma from the shoul
ders of the police,69 the Court's new exception fails to heed Justice
Brennan's reminder in Michigan v. Mosley70 that measures designed to
protect the Fifth Amendment privilege must be sensitive to the dan
gers of compulsion. 71 Hence the Court, while seeking to achieve a le
gitimate goal in formulating the Quarles rule, has ignored the concern
of the constitutional framers for the criminally accused to be free of
coercive tactics designed to wring self-incriminating statements from
their lips. 72
lenged confessions in the four consolidated cases before it might not have been coerced
under traditional standards, believed that the Fifth Amendment nevertheless required
warnings designed to eliminate the inherent compulsion of police questioning of a suspect
in their custody. [d. Considering that the circumstances surrounding custodial question
ing are cloaked in secrecy, the Court chose to require that warnings be given to all defend
ants who are subjected to custodial interrogation. [d.; Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at
2646 (Marshall, J., dissenting); 1 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 6.5
(1984).
63. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 442-443; see Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707,
718 (1979).
64. Quarles, 467 U.S. at - , 104 S. Ct. at 2636 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part); 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2644 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
65. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
66. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 406 (1977).
67. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2649 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
68. [d. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2647 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
69. [d. at - , 104 S. Ct. at 2633. "We decline to place officers such as Officer Kraft
in the untenable position of having to consider, often in a matter of seconds, whether it best
serves society for them to ask the necessary questions without the Miranda warnings and
render whatever probative evidence they uncover inadmissible, or for them to give the
warnings in order to preserve the admissibility of evidence they might uncover but possibly
damage or destroy their ability to obtain that evidence and neutralize the volatile situation
confronting them." [d. at 2633 (footnote omitted).
70. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
71. [d. at 115-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
72. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458-61.
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Allowing the interrogation of a criminal suspect without Miranda
warnings in the interest of public safety would indeed protect the pub
lic. But permitting the fruits of such an interrogation to be admitted
into evidence would not further the interests of public safety. "Police
officers genuinely concerned with saving lives would continue to seek
such information even at the risk of jeopardizing subsequent convic
tion of the suspect. "73
In an apparent attempt to counter the argument that nothing
would prevent the Quarles rule from applying to all custodial interro
gations,74 the majority sought to keep the exception within the narrow
context in which it was intended to operate. The Court implied that
the public safety exception would apply only to situations where there
was an imminent threat to the public safety.75 It remains to be seen
whether courts applying the rule in Quarles to future cases will remain
faithful to its narrow focus. 76
73. Gardner, supra note 15 at 473. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2648
(Marshall, J., dissenting); cf Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.222, 225 (1971)(confession ob
tained in violation of Miranda may be used to impeach defendant's testimony as prohibited
police practices are sufficiently deterred when confession is unavailable to the state to prove
its case in chief); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206-07 (1964)(exigent circum
stances may provide justification for obtaining statements in violation of Sixth Amendment
though they may not be introduced at trial).
74. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2643 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
75. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2633-34 n.8. See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying
text for discussion of the ambiguous nature of the imminency requirement.
76. Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2633. Illinois has held that Quarles is only applicable to
cases wherein the police have only limited time to defuse a volatile situation. People v.
B.R., 133 Ill. App. 3d 946, 479 N.E.2d 1084 (1985); See People v. Roundtree, 135 Ill. App.
3d 1075, 482 N.E.2d 693, 697-98 (1985); Compare Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at
2632-33 (this was a "kaleidoscopic situation" where the police had only "a matter of
seconds" to choose whether to preserve the admissibility of evidence or to quell a threat to
the public safety).
Presently only one court has admitted a custodial statement obtained without Miranda
warnings solely under the Quarles rule. People v. Cole, 165 Cal. App. 3d 41, 211 Cal. Rptr.
242 (1985)(missing knife). See also United States v. Udey, 748 F.2d 1231, 1240 n.4 (8th
Cir. 1984)(missing shotgun)(dicta).
Regrettably, miscomprehension of the public safety exception is already apparent as
the Fifth Circuit has stated that Quarles would be applicable where necessary to protect not
the public safety but the defendant's safety in the case of his impending suicide. United
States v. Webb, 755 F.2d 382, 392 n.14 (5th Cir. 1985)(dicta).
Additionally, courts have expresed hostility toward the case. See Rogers v. United
States, 483 A.2d 277, 283 (D.C. App. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1223 (l985)("We
choose not to reach the constitutionality of an exigent circumstances exception to Miranda
. . . even were we to assume Quarles to be of retroactive effect.") ; Nebraska v. McCarthy,
218 Neb. 246, 249,353 N.W.2d 14, 17 (1984)("Whatever the merits of the Quarles holding,
that case is simply not this case . . . [t]he house in question was surrounded by armed men;
defendant McCarthy was certainly 'deprived of his freedom'; and there was no public dan
ger present").
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The scope of the Quarles rule will evolve on a case by case basis as
reviewing courts determine whether or not the interest of public safety
may excuse a given Miranda violation. 77 An instructive device for
testing the contours of the public safety exception is to reconsider
prior United States Supreme Court cases by applying the Quarles rule
to the facts of those prior cases. 78
The note will analyze three cases using this method. They have
been chosen because their facts are such that were they presented to a
reviewing court today, the prosecution could make colorable argu
ments that the violation of the suspect's "constitutional rights" were
excusable in the interest of protecting the public safety under the
Quarles rule. The three cases are: Orozco v. Texas,79 Rhode Island v.
Innis,80 and Brewer v. Williams. 81
A.

Orozco v. Texas

Police arrested and interrogated Orozco in his bedroom, without
giving him Miranda warnings,82 four hours after a murder had been
committed. The police asked Orozco whether he had been at the
scene of the murder and whether he owned a weapon. Orozco an
swered these questions as well as two additional questions concerning
77. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2636 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
78. The Court has previously rejected this method of analysis in the context of fash
ioning standards for the determination of whether probable cause exists to issue a search
warrant. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 n.11 (1983). The reasons for the Court's
disapproval of this method, however, are not present in a review of prior cases under the
Quarles rule.
First, the Court rejected this method for analyzing the validity of the "totality of the
circumstances" test for determining whether probable cause exists because "[t]here are so
many variables in the probable cause equation that one determination will seldom be a
useful precedent for another." Id. In the context of the public safety exception, however,
this complexity is not present since the Quarles rule will apply only if there was an objective
need to interrogate a suspect without Miranda warnings. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S.
Ct. at 2632. Additionally, the rule in Quarles is purported to be easy to apply. Id. at -,
104 S. Ct. at 2633.
Second, in Gates the Court had revamped the prior probable cause standard of Aguilar
v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). Gates, 462
U.S. 213. In Quarles however, the Court did not revamp Miranda but carved out an excep
tion to the rule. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2632. Hence, rather than apply
ing a reformed standard to prior cases, reflective application of Quarles to Orozco and to
Innis only seeks to apply the exception to the rule under which those prior cases had been
decided. Considering Brewer v. Williams under the Quarles reasoning only tests a possible
progression in the public safety concept.
79. 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
80. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
81. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
82. Orozco, 394 U.S. at 325.
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the location of the weapon. 83 The answers to these questions were
admitted at trial,84 and Orozco was convicted of murder. 85
The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the
ground that Orozco's responses to the police interrogation were ob
tained without Miranda warnings. 86 The Court addressed its holding
to the question of whether Miranda's requirements were only applica
ble to station-house questioning. 87 While the four consolidated cases
decided in Miranda all dealt with police station questioning,88 the
Court held that its decision would also be applicable to police interro
gation conducted "after a person has been . . . deprived of his free
dom of action in any significant way."89 Although Miranda stressed
the compelling nature of the incommunicado environment inherent in
police station questioning,90 the Court in Orozco had no difficulty in
holding that Miranda warnings were required under the facts in
Orozco. 91 As the circumstances surrounding the questioning were in
herently compelling,92 the Court was unpersuaded by the state's argu
ment that Miranda should not apply when the suspect was
interrogated in the familiar surroundings of his own bedroom.
The fact that the interrogation in Orozco occurred four hours af
ter the murder does not diminish the same dangers that moved the
Court in Quarles to find a threat to public safety: namely, that the
missing weapon might be used by an accomplice or might cause injury
to an innocent person. 93 As Justice Marshall noted in Quarles: "In
both cases, a dangerous weapon was missing, and in neither case was
there any direct evidence where the weapon was hidden."94
Although the Quarles Court stressed the time lapse between the
arrest of the suspect and the alleged crime in Orozco as significant,95
the requirement that the threat to public safety be "imminent" is a
83. Id.
84. Id at 325-26.
85. Id. at 324.
86. Id. at 326.
87. See id. at 326-27.
88. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.
89. Id. at 444 (dicta)(footnote omitted).
90. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.
91. Orozco, 394 U.S. at 326-27.
92. Id. at 326-27. The state argued that since Orozco was interrogated in his bed
room, the compelling atmosphere of police station questioning at issue in Miranda was not
present. The Court was not persuaded by this argument in light of the general concern of
the Miranda Court about the compelling nature of custodial questioning in general. Id.
93. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2643 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
94. Id.
95. Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2633-34 n.8.
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major weakness in the Court's contention that the new exception will
be a narrow one. Differing judicial perceptions of whether a particular
threat is imminent will cause great variance in the scope of the Quarles
rule 96 as it is interpreted by individual judges. 97 Although Justice
Rehnquist characterizes the missing weapon in Orozco as not present
ing an imminent threat to public safety, his view of remoteness may
well be another judge's view ofimmediacy.98 A broader interpretation
of what constitutes an imminent threat to public safety would result in
an affirmance of Orozco's conviction on grounds that the Miranda vio
lation should be excused on public safety grounds.
The Quarles majority also sought to distinguish Orozco by noting
that the interrogation in Orozco was only investigatory rather than
prompted by a need to protect the public. 99 The distinction, however,
is without merit. In Quarles, the suspect had been asked only one
question, Where is the gun?l00 In Orozco the police had asked the sus
pect four questions: what was his name, whether he had been at the
scene of the murder, whether he owned a pistol, and where the
weapon was located. \01 Justice Harlan, concurring, felt constrained
by stare decisis to reverse Orozco's conviction but noted that the deci
sion condemned a "perfectly understandable, sensible, proper, and in
deed commendable piece of police work . . . "\02 since the police
already had a solid case against Orozco. As Justice White suggested,
the police had sufficient evidence to link Orozco to the crime, and the
interrogation was a prudent measure to ascertain the location of the
missing weapon to protect the public. \03 Moreover, had the police
asked Orozco but one question, such as, Where is the gun?, the notion
that the question was investigatory would be lost. The focus of the
questioning then would undoubtedly have been on locating the
weapon to protect the public, rather than on linking Orozco to the
96. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at - , 104 s. Ct. at 2636 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part); Traynor, The Devils ofDue Process in Criminal Detection, Detention and
Trial, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 659 (\966). "We may try to see things as objectively as we
please. None the less, we can never see them with any eyes except our own." B. CARDOZO,
The Method of Philosophy, in THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 9, 13 (\921). See
also People v. Cole, 165 Cal. App. 3d 41, 211 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1985).
97. See Orozco, 394 U.S. at 330-31 (White, J., dissenting).
98. Cardozo, supra note 96, at 12.
99. Quarles, 467 U.S. at - , 104 S. Ct. at 2633-34 n.8.
100. Id., 467 U.S. at - , 104 S. Ct. at 2642 (Marshall, J., dissenting); 467 U.S. at-,
104 S. Ct. at 2633.
IO\. Orozco, 394 U.S. 330 (White, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 328 (Harlan, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 330-31 (White, J., dissenting). "Prudent measures" may be interpreted as
acts in protection of the public safety. See, e.g., supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
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crime. Orozco's confession could then be said to come under the nar
row scope of the Quarles rule thereby allowing affirmation rather than
reversal of his conviction.
The difficulty in defining the amorphous scope of the Quarles rule
is revealed from this review of Orozco. The truly unfortunate conse
quence of Quarles is that the narrow scope of the public safety excep
tion will expand and contract depending on the perspective of a
particular judge. 104

B.

Rhode Island v. Innis

Innis was arrested for the armed robbery of a taxicab driver. \05
Police repeatedly gave Innis Miranda warnings after which he said
that he wanted to speak with a lawyer. I06 On the trip to the station
house, with Innis sitting in the back seat of the police car, the police
officers discussed the hazards of a loose shotgun in the vicinity of a
school for handicapped children. \07 In response to this conversation
Innis told the police to turn the car around so he could show them
where the gun was located. \08 He thereafter divulged the location of
the gun to the police. The statements and the gun were admitted at
trial, and Innis was convicted of robbery, kidnapping, and murder. \09
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed the conviction and held
that Innis had been improperly interrogated after invoking his right to
counsel. I \0
The United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded, rein
stating Innis's conviction. The Court held that Innis had not been
interrogated by the police after invoking his right to speak with an
attorney. II I It said that an interrogation for Miranda purposes is not
limited to express questions but also extends "to any words or actions
on the part of police . . . that the police should know are reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." 112 Based
104. See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
105. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 294.
106. Id.
107. Id. See infra notes 123-124 and accompanying text.
108. Innis, 446 U.S. at 295.
109. Id. at 291. The murder charge stemmed from the robbery of another taxicab
driver the previous week whose body had been discovered the day before Innis was ar
rested. Id. at 293.
110. State v. Innis, 120 R.l. 641, 650-52, 391 A.2d 1158, 1163-64 (1978), rev'd, 446
U.S. 291 (1980).
Ill. Innis, 446 U.S. at 302-04.
112. Id. at 300-01. Indeed, the New York Court of Appeals had held that placing
stolen goods outside of the jail cell where an accused burglar was confined was interroga
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on the fact that the police had no reason to know that Innis was par
ticularly susceptible "to an appeal to his conscience concerning the
safety of handicapped children," the Court held that under this stan
dard the discussion in the police car had not been an interrogation. 1I3
Application of the Quarles rule to the facts in Rhode Island v.
Innis I 14 is useful for two reasons. First, like Quarles, Innis involved a
firearm missing in an area where it could do harm to innocent per
sons. IIS Second, reexamination of Innis provides an opportunity to
explore the question of whether the public safety exception would per
mit custodial questioning of an accused once the accused expresses a
desire to speak with an attorney."6
Assuming arguendo that Innis had been interrogated after invok
ing his right to counsel, as three justices concluded, 117 the facts of the
case would then be ripe for a Quarles application because it could be
argued that the interrogation of the accused was conducted in the in
terest of finding the weapon to protect the public safety. Indeed the
Quarles Court, in distinguishing Innis, entirely rejected the analogy on
the basis that the holding in Innis was grounded solely in the finding
that Innis had not been interrogated. lls
In Innis the accused was arrested on suspicion of holding up a
taxicab with a shotgun four hours earlier." 9 While the four hour gap
between the crime and the arrest is a fact similar to that found in
tion under this formula. People v. Ferro, 63 N.Y.2d 316, 319,472 N.E.2d 13,14,482
N.Y.S.2d 237, 238 (1984); Accord Oney v. Delaware, 482 A.2d 756 (1984).
113. Innis, 446 U.S. at 302.
114. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
115. Id. at 294-95. The gun was missing in an area where a school for handicapped
children was located. See infra notes 123-124 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 125-144 and accompanying text. The Court in Innis indicated
that there is a right to counsel in the Fifth Amendment distinct from the Sixth Amendment
privilege. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300 n.4. For a discussion of whether Quarles may extend into
the Sixth Amendment protections, see infra notes 165-190 and accompanying text.
117. The Court was split on whether or not Innis had been interrogated within the
new standard of interrogation. Justices Marshall and Brennan could not "imagine a
stronger appeal to a suspect--any suspect-than the assertion that if the weapon is not
found an innocent person would be hurt or killed. . . . The notion that such an appeal
could not be expected to have any effect unless the suspect was known to have some special
interest in handicapped children verges on the ludicrous." Id. at 306 (Marshall, J., dissent
ing)(emphasis in original).
Justice Stevens took exception to the Court's new standard. Id. at 309-314 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Additionally, he said that even if the standard developed by the majority
was a proper one, the case should have been remanded for a factual determination of
whether Innis had been interrogated under the new test. Id. at 314-317.
118. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2633-34 n.8.
119. Innis, 446 U.S. at 293-94.
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Orozco v. Texas,120 two additional factors indicate that Innis is a more
compelling case than Orozo for the application of the Quarles rule.
First, there are strong indications that the police were extremely
concerned about locating the missing shotgun. 121 Although the Court
in Quarles said that the application of the public safety exception
would not depend on the sUbjective motivation of the questioning po
lice officers,122 the officers' profound concern for the location of the
gun at least provides some indication that there was an actual threat to
the public's safety.
Second, the threat is bolstered by the fact that the missing shot
gun was believed to be in an area frequented by handicapped chil
dren. 123 Hence, even the most skeptical observer would be compelled
to find an objectively reasonable need to locate the weapon to secure
the safety of children who would be passing through the area shortly
thereafter on their way to school. 124 Consequently, protecting these
children would most certainly provide a valid basis for interrogation
of Innis under the Quarles exception.
One of the most troubling aspects of Quarles is the effect that the
public safety exception may have on an accused's request for counsel
after Miranda warnings. 125 The Court in Miranda said that
[o]nce warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear.
If the individual states that he wants an attorney present, the interrogation
must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must
have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present
during any subsequent questioning. 126

Hence, the Court in Miranda read a right to counsel component into
the Fifth Amendment to protect the defendant's right to remain silent,
which was separate and distinct from the right to counsel guaranteed
120. 394 U.S. 324 (1969). See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
121. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 295. The police sent a "parade of police cars" to the
location where Innis said that he had hidden the gun. Additionally, the police captain
"ordered the numerous officers still present to position their vehicles so that the headlights
could illuminate the area . . . ." Brief for Respondent at 6-7, Rhode Island v. Innis, 446
U.S. 291 (1980).
122. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2632.
123. Innis was arrested one block from a city school serving mentally handicapped
children. State v. Innis, 120 R.1. 641, 666-67, 391 A.2d 1158,1171 (1978)(Kelleher, J.,
dissenting).
124. Id. at 667,391 A.2d at 1171 (Kelleher, J., dissenting). Compare New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. at - , 104 S. Ct. at 2632 (the gun could have been retrieved by an accom
plice or found by an employee or a customer).
125. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1985); infra notes 128-137.
126. 384 U.S. at 473-74. Accord Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979).
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by the Sixth Amendment. 127
The Court in Edwards v. Arizona 128 reinforced the Fifth Amend
ment right to counsel by developing a bright line for protection of a
suspect's request for counsel in response to the Miranda warnings.
Justice White,129 writing for a unanimous Court, held that when an
accused requests to speak with an attorney the police may not initiate
further interrogation of the accused 130 "unless the accused himself ini
tiates further communication."131 Subsequent decisions of the Court
have indicated that the Edwards initiation requirement "set forth 'a
prophylactic rule, designed to protect an accused in police custody
from being badgered by police officers. . .''' once a request for coun
sel has been made. 132
Where public safety is concerned, it is logical to extend the rea
soning of the Quarles opinion to justify abridgement of the Fifth
127.

Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 481-82 n.7 (1981). See Innis, 446 U.S. at 300

n.4.

The difference between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel is the time at
which the right attaches. In the Sixth Amendment context, the right to counsel does not
attach until the commencement of judicial proceedings against the accused. See Williams,
430 U.S. at 398-99. The Fifth Amendment right, however, attaches once a request for
counsel is made. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85. Thus, the Fifth Amendment right to
counsel created by Miranda fills an important gap in the Sixth Amendment right. See
Innis, 446 U.S. at 300 n.4.
128. 451 U.S. 477 (1981). Edwards was arrested for robbery, burglary, and first
degree murder. After a brief interrogation session, Edwards indicated that he wanted to
speak with an attorney. The interrogation then ceased, and Edwards was placed in the
county jail for the night. The next day the police resumed questioning and told Edwards
that he had to respond. Edwards then incriminated himself, the confession was introduced
at trial, and Edwards was convicted. The Supreme Court reversed on grounds that the
second interrogation was conducted in violation of Miranda, since Edwards had previously
requested to speak with a lawyer. The Court held that once an accused requests to speak
with an attorney, the accused "is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities
until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further
communication, exchanges or conversations with the police." Edwards, 451 U.S. at 478
488.
129. Although Justice White's opinion in Edwards gave the Miranda doctrine strong
support, he has previously expressed grave doubts about the validity of the Miranda rules.
See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 531-37 (White, J., dissenting); Mosely, 423 U.S. at 108 (White, J.,
concurring); Orozco, 394 U.S. at 330 (White, J., dissenting); Mathis v. United States, 391
U.S. I, 5-6 (1968)(White, J., dissenting). Justice White, however, has expressed stronger
sentiment toward the right to counsel in general than he has toward other aspects of the
Miranda rules. Compare Edwards, 451 U.S. 477 with Orozco, 394 U.S. at 330 (White, J.,
dissenting).
130. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85. The Court somewhat diluted the impact of the
Edwards initiation requirement in Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983).
131. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485.
132. See Smith v. Illinois, 105 S. Ct. 490, 492 n.2 (1984)(per curiam)(quoting Wy
rick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 45-46 (1982)(per curiam».
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Amendment right to counsel. Even when a suspect requests to speak
to an attorney, the Constitution does not require suppression of re
sponses to non-coercive public safety interrogation. The Quarles
Court justified the public safety exception in part by finding that the
Miranda warnings are not rights protected by the Constitution but
rather are only a judicially created device to protect the vitality of the
Fifth Amendment. 133 The Court has noted previously that Miranda's
requirement that interrogation cease immediately upon the accused's
request for counsel is not a constitutional mandate but a prophylactic
device which recognizes that a request for counsel is a per se invoca
tion of Fifth Amendment rights. 134 Likewise, the lack of a constitu
tional mandate for the "rigid" prophylactic rule135 of Edwards 136
suggests its susceptibility to the balancing test of the Quarles
exception. 137
Although the plain meaning of Miranda prohibits interrogation
of a suspect once the suspect invokes the right to speak with coun
sel,138 the Quarles Court held that departure from Miranda's require
ments are permissible when there is an imminent threat to public
safety.139 In essence, the Fifth Amendment right to counsel is only
another prophylactic measure to protect the privilege against self-in
crimination,14O and this may be outweighed by the need to obtain in
133. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 s. Ct. at 2631. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.
433 (1974); supra note 15.
134. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979); See Smith v. Illinois, 105 S. Ct.
490,492-93 (1984); Edwards, 451 U.S at 491-92 (1981)(Powell, J., concurring).
135. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979).
136. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 492 (Powell, J., concurring).
137. The court has previously trimmed back the broad scope of the protections af
forded by Miranda on the grounds that they are only prophylactic measures to protect
Fifth Amendment rights. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, -, 104 S. Ct. 2626,
2633 (1984)(Miranda warnings need not be given when the situation presents exigent cir
cumstances, which pose a threat to public safety); Solem v. Stumes, 104 S. Ct. 1338, 1343
(1984)(Edwards rule not to be applied retroactively because it is only a prophylactic rule);
South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564 n.15 (1983)(suspect's refusal to take blood
alcohol test admissible at trial for driving while intoxicated because police inquiry of
whether suspect will take blood alcohol test is not an interrogation within meaning of Mi
randa); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,445-46, 449-52 (1974)(failure to advise suspect
that he has right to appointed counsel does not bar admissibility of testimony of third party
whose identity was obtained from the accused's lips); Gardner, supra note 15 at 456-60.
138. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484.
139. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. 2633. But see supra text at note 68; Smith v.
Illinois, 105 S. Ct. 490, 492 (1984)(per curiam)(once an accused requests counsel, interro
gation must cease to prevent badgering by the police to elicit responses and override the
defendant's will).
140. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974); Smith v. Illinois, 105 S. Ct. 490,
495 (1984); Solemn v. Stumes, 104 S. Ct. 1338, 1342-43 & n.4 (1984); Oregon v. Bradshaw,
462 U.S. 1039 (1983).
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formation from the accused to avert a public danger. 141 Therefore, the
conclusion appears inescapable that since the Fifth Amendment right
to counsel is only a judicially created right, 142 the. balancing approach
used by the Quarles Court l43 will eventually serve to allow circumven
tion of the right to counsel when necessary to protect the pUblic. 144
Proponents of such an extension of Quarles point out that the
accused can always seek to prove that his statements were not volun
tary but instead were coerced. 145 Interrogation conducted after an ac
cused has requested to speak with counsel would weigh heavily against
a finding that the statements were voluntarily made. 146 The ability of
the accused to prove that a statement was compelled, however, is a
heavy burden to sustain. 147
The possible extension of Quarles to excuse violations of an ac
cused's Fifth Amendment right to counsel casts the warnings man
dated by Miranda into the conundrum of a Catch-22.148 On the one
hand, the police may withhold the warnings in order to protect the
public. In this instance, "by deliberately withholding Miranda warn
ings, the police can get information out of suspects who would refuse
to respond to police questioning were they advised of their constitu
tional rights."149 On the other hand, even when a suspect invokes his
judicially created Fifth Amendment right to counsel, the police may
be able to subvert the invocation of these rights by continued interro
gation that is pursued in the interest of protecting the public. 150
C.

Brewer v. Williams

Williams was sought for the kidnapping of a ten-year-old girl in
Des Moines, Iowa.lSI Upon advice of his retained counsel in Des
141. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2633; See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 544
(White, J., dissenting).
142. See supra text at notes 125-26 and 132.
143. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
144. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at - , 104 S. Ct. at 2643 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 123 (1977).
145. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2631, n.5; but see Smith v. Illinois, 105
S. Ct. 490, 495 n.8 (1984)(per curiam)(application of Edwards rule does not depend on
whether responses were actually coerced).
146. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
147. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 480-82.
148. Catch-22 is "a dilemma from which the victim has no escape." OXFORD AMER
ICAN DICTIONARY 97 (1980).
149. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2647 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see
Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2632.
150. See supra notes 138-144.
151. Williams, 430 U.S. 387.
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Moines, Williams voluntarily surrendered to the Davenport, Iowa,
police. ls2 Williams's Des Moines attorney advised him by telephone
not to speak to the police in Davenport nor to the police officers from
Des Moines who would be driving him back to Des Moines later that
day.153 The Des Moines officers assigned to transport Williams agreed
with Williams's attorney not to question Williams during the trip.
Williams was then arraigned in Davenport on an arrest warrant
issued in Des Moines charging him with the kidnapping. Williams
conferred with an attorney in Davenport after the arraignment.
Detective Learning and another officer arrived from Des Moines to
transport Williams back to Des Moines. Before embarking on the
three-hour drive, Williams again spoke with the Davenport lawyer
who advised him to say nothing to the officers on the drive to Des
Moines. ls4 Additionally, the Davenport attorney admonished Detec
tive Learning not to question Williams on the ride to Des Moines. lss
During the trip, Williams asserted repeatedly that he would not
answer any questions until he had an opportunity to speak with his
attorney in Des Moines. ls6 Detective Learning proceeded to engage
Williams in small talk to set him at ease. IS7 With the knowledge that
Williams was a religious zealot, Detective Learning delivered the re
nowned "Christian Burial Speech"158 in the hope of prompting Wil
liams to disclose the location of the kidnap victim's body.ls9 In
response to this monologue, Williams led the police to the body.16o
152. Id. at 390.
153. Id. at 391.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 391-92.
156. Id. at 392.
157. Id.
158. Detective Learning said to Williams:
I want to give you something to think about while we're travelling down the
road. . . . Number one, I want you to observe the weather conditions, it's raining, it's
sleeting, it's freezing, driving is very treacherous, visibility is poor, it's going to be dark
early this evening. They are predicting several inches of snow for tonight, and I feel that
you yourself are the only person that knows where this little girl's body is, that you yourself
have only been there once, and if you get a snow on top of it you yourself may be unable to
find it. And, since we will be going right past the area on the way into Des Moines, I feel
that we could stop and locate the body, that the parents of this little girl should be entitled
to a Christian burial for the little girl who was snatched away from them on Christmas
[E]ve and murdered. And I feel we should stop and locate it on the way in rather than
waiting until morning and trying to come back out after a snow storm and possibly not
being able to find it at all.
Id. at 392-93.
159. Id. at 399.
160. Id. at 393.
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Williams was subsequently convicted of murder. 161 His convic
tion was affirmed by the Iowa Supreme Court which held that Wil
liams had waived his right to counsel in disclosing the location of the
body. 162 The United States Supreme Court granted habeas corpus re
lief. The Court held that Detective Learning's "Christian Burial
Speech" was a violation of Williams's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, as defined in Massiah v. United States 163 in that it was a delib
erate attempt to elicit information from Williams after judicial pro
ceedings had commenced against him.l64
Consideration of the facts in Brewer v. Williams in light of the
Quarles opinion presents an opportunity to probe the appropriateness
of creating a public safety exception to the Sixth Amendment to per
mit infringement of the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel
in the interest of protecting the public. 165 Although the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is an express constitutional require
ment,166 the interest in rescuing a kidnap victim or another public
safety concern may well prompt the Court to hold that such good faith
motivation is a valid excuse for violation of an accused's Sixth Amend
ment rights. 167
Although public safety is a valued goal, the theoretical founda
161. Id. at 394.
162. State v. Williams, 182 S.W.2d 396, 402 (Iowa 1970).
163. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). In Massiah, the defendant had been indicted for violations
of federal narcotics laws. At the behest of federal agent Murphy, Colson, one of Massiah's
co-defendants, lured Massiah into his car which had been equipped by federal agents with a
radio transmitter. Colson engaged Massiah in a conversation about the pending charges
while Murphy eavesdropped on the conversation over the radio. At trial, Murphy testified
as to the substance of Massiah's self-incriminations, and Massiah was convicted of several
narcotics violations.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Massiah's Sixth Amendment right to coun
sel had been violated when the government had deliberately elicited incriminating state
ments from him, without the assistance of counsel, subsequent to the indictments. Id.
164. Williams, 430 U.S. at 398-99. The Court said that the Iowa court had applied
the wrong standard for determining whether Williams had waived his rights. [d. at 401-04.
The U.S. Supreme Court noted that the Iowa Supreme Court had erroneously analyzed the
case as one involving a violation of Miranda. [d. at 397. Instead the Court said that Wil
liams's right to counsel as defined in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), had
been violated, that is, once judicial proceedings have begun, the government may not delib
erately elicit incriminating responses from the defendant. Williams, 430 U.S. at 397-98.
The Court implied that the standard for waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is
higher than the standard for waiver of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel and that the
government had not met its burden of proof that Williams had waived his Sixth Amend
ment right. See Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah and Miranda: What is "Interroga
tion"? When does it Matter?, 67 GEO. L.J. 1,28-33 (1978).
165. See infra text at notes 172-179.
166. See infra text at notes 168-171.
167. See infra notes 172-190 and accompanying text.
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tion of Quarles weighs heavily against creating an emergency excep
tion to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The foundation of the
public safety exception rests in a determination that the warnings re
quired by Miranda are not constitutionally required but rather are ju
dicial devices to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege. 168 Violations
of Miranda are excused on public safety grounds because the accused
does not have a constitutional right per se to receive the warnings but
only to be free from being compelled to incriminate himself. Hence
the need for Miranda warnings, as prophylactic measures, may be
outweighed by the need to protect the public. 169
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is derived directly from
the Constitution,170 and thus it should not be susceptible to the same
balancing approach to which the Miranda protections were subjected
in Quarles. A public safety concern should not be sufficient to justify a
violation of the constitutionally mandated right to counsel in the Sixth
Amendment. Deliberately elicting statements from the accused after
institution of judicial proceedings against him violates his substantive
Sixth Amendment rights171 rather than only judicially created
safeguards.
Chief Justice Burger, however, has expressed the view that the
rule of Massiah 172 is only a prophylactic device to protect the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.173 He reasons that the Sixth Amend
ment seeks to protect only the fairness of the accused's trial. Conse
quently, requiring exclusion of all statements obtained from the
accused without the assistance of counsel, without considering the ac
tual effect on the trial of using the uncounseled statements, is only a
prophylactic device to ensure the Sixth Amendment goal of providing
the accused a fair trial. 174
In his recent dissent in Maine v. Moulton, 175 the Chief Justice said
that no Sixth Amendment violation exists when inculpatory state
168. See supra text at notes 42-43.
169. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 s. Ct. at 2626; Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285.
170. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. Xl.
The accused's right to counsel attaches upon the institution of formal judicial proceed
ings against him. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270 (1980); Brewer v. Wil
liams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).
171. Henry, 447 U.S. at 270; Williams, 430 U.S. at 398-99; Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206.
172. "[T]he clear rule of Massiah is that once adversary proceedings have com
menced against an individual, he has a right to legal representation when the government
interrogates him." Williams, 430 U.S. at 397-98.
173. Williams, 430 U.S. at 425-26 (Burger, C.]., dissenting).
174. Id.
175. 54 U.S.L.W. 4039 (U.S. December 10, 1985).
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ments are elicited deliberately from an indicted defendant pursuant to
a legitimate law enforcement investigation targeted against the defend
ant's planning and perpetration of additional crimes. 176 The Chief
Justice stated that the incriminating statements pertaining to the in
dictment should not have been suppressed because "the state was not
trying to build its theft case against [Moulton] in obtaining the evi
dence, [and thus] excluding the evidence from the theft trial will not
affect police behavior at all."177
The Chief Justice remarked that evidence gathered after Sixth
Amendment deprivations should be supressed only after the costs and
benefits are weighed. Accordingly he would not exclude evidence ob
tained in violation of Massiah when the officers were acting" 'for legit
imate purposes not related to the gathering of evidence concerning the
crime for which [the defendant] had been indicted.' "178 Suppression
of such evidence is inappropriate when the fairness of the trial is not
affected, and the police act in good faith, leaving no conduct to
deter. 179
This argument parallels that advanced in Quarles,180 viz, that un
coerced statements obtained in violation of the prophylactic rules of
Miranda should not be suppressed where exclusion would not advance
Fifth Amendment goals. The Chief Justice's view, therefore, provides
fertile ground for the planting of a public safety exception to the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. Proponents would argue that Massiah
does not mandate suppression of statements made without assistance
of counsel if these were obtained to protect the public. In such cases,
so long as the police conduct does not affect the fairness of the ac
cused's trial, the evidence should not be suppressed because exclusion
of the evidence would not advance Sixth Amendment values,181 and
the cost of exclusion is too high.
Justice Traynor, writing for the California Supreme Court in Peo
176. Id. at 4047, 4048 (Burger, c.J., dissenting). In Moulton, the defendant, who
had been indicted on theft charges, proposed a plan to his co-defendant that they kill the
state's chief witness against them. The co-defendant, fearing for his own life, permitted the
police to conceal a transmitter on his person prior to meeting with the defendant. During
the course of the discussions about the proposed killing of the witness, the defendant made
incriminating statements, monitored by the police, which related to the subject matter of
the indictment.
177. Id. at 4048.
178. Id. (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984».
179. Id. (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. - , 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984».
180. Quarles, 467 U.S. at - , 104 S. Ct. at 2630-2631.
181. Id. Cj. Quarles, 467 U.S. at - , 104 S. Ct. at 2626 (Even though Miranda is
violated, suppression is not required so long as statement is voluntarily made under the
totality of the circumstances.)
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pie v. Modesto lS2 suggested that the Sixth Amendment should not con
strain the police from interrogating a suspect when they are searching
for a missing kidnap victim.ls3 The court said that "the officers' inves
tigatory and rescue operations were inextricably interwoven until [the
victim's] body was found, and it would be needlessly restrictive to ex
clude any evidence lawfully obtained during the rescue operations."184
Under such circumstances Massiah does not control, and the accused's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel 185 may be infringed if necessary to
obtain information to save the life of a kidnap victim. 186 The Califor
nia courts have followed the "rescue theory" in holding that the police
are justified in failing to give Miranda warnings when interrogating a
suspect in the effort to find a kidnap victim.187
Massiah, however, did not prevent the police from deliberately
elicting statements from the accused in violation of the Sixth Amend
ment in such exigent circumstances, but it prohibited the use of these
statements in evidence at trial. I88 Moreover, the Court in Williams,
while noting that attempting to locate a kidnap victim might be a no
182. 62 Cal.2d 436, 398 P.2d 753, 42 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1965).
183. Id. at 446, 398 P.2d at 759, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
184. Id. at 446-47, 398 P.2d at 759, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
185. The Modesto court believed that Massiah was applicable under the "focus test"
of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), wherein the court held that the Sixth Amend
ment right to counsel attaches when the police investigation of the crime has focused on the
accused. Under the present interpretation of Massiah, however, Modesto's Sixth Amend
ment right would not attach until he was formally charged. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682
(1972). Nonetheless, even though Massiah would not be applicable in Modesto under to
day's standards, Traynor's analysis of the kidnapping issue in the Sixth Amendment con
text illuminates the potential breadth of the public safety doctrine.
186. Modesto, 62 Cal. 2d at 447, 398 P.2d at 759, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
187. People v. Riddle, 83 Cal. App. 3d 563, 148 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 937 (1979); People v. Dean, 39 Cal. App. 3d 875, 114 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1974). The
California courts, however, recognizing that constitutional protections for the criminally
accused must be given broad effect, narrowly defined the rescue situations in which police
could fail to give Miranda warnings. In People v. Riddle, the court developed a three-part
test to determine whether a given situation provided a sufficient justification not to give
Miranda warnings:
(1) urgency of need in that no other course of action promises relief;
(2) possibility of saving human life by rescuing a person whose life is in danger;
(3) rescue as primary purpose and motive of the interrogators.
83 Cal. App. 3d at 576; 148 Cal. Rptr. at 177 (1978).
In Brewer v. Williams, the violation of Williams's Sixth Amendment rights would not
be excused under this test since at the time the "Christian Burial Speech" was given, the
police no longer believed that the kidnapping victim was no longer alive. See supra note
158.
188. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206-07; cf Quarles, 467 U.S. at - , 104 S. Ct. at 2648
(Marshall, J., dissenting)(Miranda does not proscribe this sort of questioning but rather
prohibits the introduction of such statements at trial).
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ble goal, said that "[d]isinterested zeal for the public good does not
assure either wisdom or right in the method it pursues."189 Thus the
express constitutional status of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
would appear to present too high an obstacle for the Quarles opinion
to leap. Whereas the logic of Quarles lends itself to an extension of the
emergency exception to the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, the
reasoning of Quarles does not support a violation of the express Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. On the other hand, legitimate concerns
for a kidnap victim may provide sufficient justification for infringing
upon the accused's Sixth Amendment right and allowing statements
thus obtained to be admissible at trial. In considering that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is constitutionally mandated, the rescue
justification, if adopted, should be applied narrowly190 to prevent the
complete erosion of the right to counsel.
V.

CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court in Quarles determined that the
need to protect the public from imminent threats outweighs a criminal
suspect's need to receive the warnings developed in Miranda v. Ari
zona to protect the privilege against self-incrimination. Although the
Court claims to have lifted a dilemma from the shoulders of the police,
the Court has created many new questions, yet provided few answers.
One question the court left open is the type of emergency that would
justify the failure to give the Miranda warnings. The scope of the
Quarles exception will be determined upon the lower courts' interpre
tation of how ominous a threat to public safety was present in a given
situation. Although the Supreme Court indicated that only an immi
nent threat to the public safety would justify a failure to adhere to
Miranda, much will tum on the perceptions of the individual judge,
thereby creating widely disparate results.
Post hoc examination of an alleged threat to public safety will
severely limit the broad protection Miranda provided for the privilege
against self-incrimination. Given the exigent circumstance, interroga
tion designed to quell a threat to public safety is likely to be compel
ling. Using such statements, obtained pursuant to Quarles, to prove a
defendant's guilt creates a direct clash with the Fifth Amendment.
Placing on the accused the burden of proving that the statements were
189. 430 U.S. at 406 (quoting Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 605 (1948) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring».
190. See supra note 187.
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coerced defeats the intent of the Miranda decision-to remove such a
burden from the accused.
Additionally, the Quarles decision may foreshadow an expanded
emphasis on public safety where the need to protect the public may
provide a sufficient justification to excuse the failure to adhere to other
Supreme Court pronouncements on the rights of criminal suspects.
The requirement that interrogation cease after an accused requests to
speak with an attorney is designed to assist the accused in the exercise
of his Fifth Amendment privilege. Since this Fifth Amendment right
to counsel, however, is not a constitutionally mandated protection, the
need to protect the public may well serve as a justification for interro
gating a suspect even after he makes a request to speak with an
attorney.
Allowing the use at trial of statements obtained as a result of pub
lic safety interrogation after the accused requests to speak with coun
sel would further diminish Miranda's Fifth Amendment safeguards.
Such a rule would deny an accused the assurance that the police would
only communicate in the presence of counsel once a request for a law
yer was made. A rule allowing the police to continue an interrogation
after invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel would, in
effect, deprive the Miranda requirements of their substance.
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel, because it enjoys a direct
constitutional mandate, is not as easily balanced away. While the
Quarles rule hinges on the notion that the Miranda warnings are only
procedural rights, the dictates of the Sixth Amendment are absolute
and cannot be outweighed by the need to protect the public.
On the other hand, Chief Justice Burger has suggested cutting
back the broad meaning which Massiah read into the Sixth Amend
ment right to counsel. Burger's characterization of Massiah 's rule as
only prophylactic leaves the Sixth Amendment right to counsel only a
step away from the Quarles balancing test. The Court might find the
rescue of a kidnapping victim, for example, sufficient justification to
define a narrow public safety exception and forgive violation of the
Sixth Amendment in limited circumstances.
Creation of such a public safety exceptin to the Sixth Amendment
is inconsistent with the evolution of the right to counsel. Casting Mas
siah as no more than a prophylactic rule turns the clock back on the
most fundamental right enjoyed by the accused in a criminal prosecu
tion. Our fundamental constitutional protections are directly endan
gered by the denial of counsel during interrogation to a person against
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whom adversarial proceedings have begun. No good faith exception
can justify such an action.
Jeffrey E. Levine

